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Chapter 10: Globalization and its limits: The Making of International Regulation  
 
Marie-Laure Djelic and Jabril Bensedrine  
 
10.1 INTRODUCTION 
Recent developments, particularly in Europe, make it difficult to ignore the debate around 
globalisation. Mergers, acquisitions and alliances are rapidly bringing about the 
reconstruction of many industries over and beyond national boundaries. Economic activities 
and transactions cross over national borders, making transnational mechanisms of governance 
increasingly likely and necessary. Some have argued that global pressures are leading, on a 
world-wide level, to the increasing convergence of governance and organisational structures 
and of business knowledge or practices (Chandler 1990, Ohmae 1995, Scott et al. 1994, 
Alvarez 1998). There is ample evidence, though, that local or national institutional 
arrangements still play a significant part when it comes to shaping economic structures and 
constraining economic behaviour (Whitley and Kristensen 1996, Hollingsworth and Boyer 
1997). Whether these institutional path dependencies do really imply the increasing 
divergence of national business systems in spite of global competition (Whitley 1999, Sorge 
or Kristensen and Zeitlin this volume) or whether they create the conditions for a 
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hybridisation of global pressures (Lane this volume) is still a matter for debate. In any case, 
though, it seems that the most pressing and interesting questions do lay at the point of 
intersection and interaction between transnational trends on the one hand, national or local 
actors and institutions on the other (Arias and Guillén 1998, Djelic 1998, Morgan 
introduction to this volume). 
 
This chapter approaches the issue of regulation from such a perspective. Regulation – or the 
setting of standards (Morgan introduction to this volume) – is an important mechanism for 
the co-ordination of economic activity. The definition, interpretation and implementation of 
regulation have traditionally been, at least in the age of the nation-state, the sole prerogatives 
of local and in particular national state authorities (McCraw 1984, Weiss 1988). However, 
since the end of the Second World War, the trend has been for regulation to take on a 
transnational dimension. Still, little is known about the making of regulation in the 
international environment or about the way transnational regulatory standards are then 
implemented, whether in supranational, national or subnational arenas. The objective of this 
chapter is to go some way towards filling this gap. 
 
We focus in turn on competition regulation and on the regulation of CFC products as two 
examples of standards with a transnational if not global impact. Rather than taking these 
regulatory standards for granted and assessing their impact on the behaviour of economic 
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actors, we define them as our dependent variables. What we want to understand, through our 
empirical cases, is the way in which transnational regulation has been and is constructed, 
diffused, interpreted and implemented. With this objective in mind, we engage in a double 
exercise in deconstruction, looking for conditions, actors and mechanisms explaining the 
emergence, diffusion and institutionalisation of transnational regulatory standards with 
respect to competitive behaviour or CFC production. We pay particular attention to the 
interplay between transnational and national spheres, pointing to a highly contested process 
in both cases although with quite different characteristics. In the end, the comparison allows 
us to draw more general conclusions about the contribution of transnational regulation to 
structural and behavioural convergence. It allows us to reflect, in other words, on the process 
of globalisation and on its limits.  
 
10.2 A HYBRID NEO-INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK 
The broad claim that economic activity and interactions are embedded in wider sets of 
environmental or institutional constraints is a good starting point to approach the issue of 
regulation. Regulation as the formalised expression of standards and norms is indeed hard to 
disentangle from the contexts of its construction, diffusion, interpretation and 
implementation. This, though, tells us little if anything at all. Important questions remain, 
bearing on the nature, scale or scope of that institutional context, on the extent to which it 
allows action and is likely to undergo change (Djelic 1998). Existing variants of neo-
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institutionalism differ quite significantly in fact on all those dimensions (Clemens and Cook 
1999). As they stand, none of these variants is able to grasp on its own the full complexity of 
the issue at hand, particularly with respect to the interplay between transnational and national 
spheres. We propose as a consequence a combination or crossbreeding of two of those 
variants that are labelled respectively ‘phenomenological’ and ‘historical’ neo-
institutionalisms (Djelic 1999). 
 
Phenomenological neo-institutionalism (DiMaggio and Powell 1983, Scott et al. 1994) 
defines institutions as sets of cultural rules and norms. The latter have had a tendency, 
particularly throughout the second part of the twentieth century, to become more and more 
similar across national boundaries – rationalisation describing the overall evolution. In this 
research tradition, national economies and their constituent parts are defined as emergent 
social constructions embedded in larger institutional environments understood as sets of 
cultural rules and norms. Homogenisation of institutional environments across national 
boundaries logically drives worldwide isomorphism in structural arrangements and 
behavioural scripts, including – but not only – in the economic and business realm.  
Historical neo-institutionalism, on the other hand, emphasizes the strength and historical 
significance of cultural and structural rules defined at the national level (Dobbin 1994, 
Fligstein 1990, Campbell, Hollingsworth and Lindberg eds. 1991, Hollingsworth and Boyer 
1997, Whitley 1999). Historically, the argument goes, different sets of beliefs or structural 
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arrangements have been stabilised and institutionalised at the level of each nation, often 
through the key role of state actors or political institutions, creating the context for different 
logics of action and multiple ‘rationalities’. Ultimately, national systems of economic 
organisation are shaped by those stable and long-standing rules and structural legacies.  
 
If we are going to focus on the interplay between the transnational and the national – and not 
on one sphere or the other – it seems that a theoretical cross-breeding between these two 
variants of neo-institutionalism would indeed make sense. ‘Phenomenological’ neo-
institutionalism is an interesting lens to look at the structuration of a transnational world, its 
workings and mechanisms. Questions, on the other hand, about the origins of such a 
structuration process, about its local impact and about the possible associated process of 
‘translation’ or reinterpretation at the national or sub-national level, fit much better with the 
‘historical’ variant of neo-institutionalism.  
 
Using such a hybrid theoretical framework, we also insist upon an historical perspective and 
analysis. This allows us, for both sets of regulation, to delve more into the questions of the 
origins and to look at processes, in particular when it comes to diffusion. This also allows us 
to point, beyond institutional constraints, to the role of actors – whether organisations, 
networks or individuals. This leads us to ask, finally, about the extent of local adaptation or 
reinterpretation in each case and about the likelihood of full-scale convergence.  
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10.3 COMPETITION: TURNING LOCAL STANDARDS INTO GLOBAL ONES 
In our contemporary world, rules of competition appear to transcend national boundaries. 
Over the past fifty years or so, around fifty countries have adopted similar sets of principles 
that set limits to anti-competitive practices and, in particular, regulate cartels and loose 
agreements. Under the labels ‘antitrust’ or ‘antimonopoly’, these principles justify and frame 
the intervention of national or cross-national agencies in charge of regulating competition. 
The American Federal Trade Commission (FTC) or the European Commission might reach 
different conclusions on a given case. Their overall philosophy, though, is not too far apart. 
Neither is it in contradiction with the general principles that shape the understanding of 
competition regulation characteristic of the World Trade Organisation (WTO). 
 
A foray into history shows that similarity, here, is not a chance happening. Nor has it been 
driven by a pure logic of efficiency or by the presumed ‘natural laws’ of the market economy. 
We point to a direct thread linking the numerous versions of antitrust or anti-monopoly 
standards, policies and procedures to the 1890 American Sherman Antitrust Act. Without 
prejudging of the legitimacy, in economic and efficiency terms, of antitrust or anti-monopoly 
standards, we argue that these standards are neither universal nor neutral. What we find is 
that a particular understanding of competition regulation, that originally emerged in the 
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United States under unique institutional and historical conditions, came to be diffused and 
transferred during the twentieth century on a nearly global scale. 
 
The transfer took place in two main stages. The first stage started immediately after the end 
of the Second World War. Competition regulation principles were then exported from the 
United States into Western European countries as well as into the emerging set of cross-
national institutions such as the GATT, the European Coal and Steel Community or the 
European Economic Community. The second stage came after 1989 with the opening and 
radical transformation of former communist countries. The logic behind the transfer was, in 
both periods, at least as much political and geopolitical as it was economic. Unsurprisingly, 
the process was not smooth. On the ground, it ran up against pre-existing legacies and it often 
encountered resistance and obstacles. This accounts in part for local differences in the 
interpretation and implementation of antitrust or anti-monopoly principles.   
 
10.3.1 Context: the construction of an American antitrust tradition  
In the United States, discussions on a legislation to regulate interfirm cooperation and 
competition started in a period of significant economic turbulence. During the years 
following the Civil War, American firms had to face major disruptions in their environments, 
to which they reacted by searching for order and control through collusion and cooperation. 
Loose arrangements or agreements, cartels or pools multiplied at the time, creating significant 
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concern within civil society about their increasing power (McCraw 1984, Chandler 1990, 
Fligstein 1990). The Populist movement played upon the fear of farmers and small 
independent business owners, calling for a regulation of competitive practices and a breaking 
up of the most disruptive aggregates.  
  
While the pressure stemming from this constituency was instrumental in bringing the ‘trust’ 
issue on the agenda of Congress, some Congressmen had their own, more ideological, 
reasons to push for competition regulation at the federal level (Thorelli 1954). At the end of 
the nineteenth century, American conservatism was a mixture of classical economics and 
social Darwinism (Hawkins 1997). Competition, in this ideological framework, was a key 
value and the sole guarantee of a healthy economy and society. The initial intent of many 
Congressmen was thus to preserve and impose ‘full and free competition’ within the 
federation of American states (Thorelli 1954). The curbing of cartels or trusts, called for by 
farmers and small business owners, would be a mere side effect of this more general fight for 
competition and freedom. 
 
10.3.1.1 The Sherman Act 
The Sherman Antitrust Act, finally enacted in 1890, fell somewhat short of this ambitious 
intent. Section I declared illegal ‘every contract, combination in the form of trust or 
otherwise, or conspiracy’ but only as long as they were ‘in restraint of trade or commerce’ 
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(Thorelli 1954). While inclusion of the ‘commerce clause’ – as the above excerpt came to be 
known – and the limits it set to the law did not reflect the original intent of Congressmen, it 
had not come about by chance. This rewording reflected a number of institutional legacies 
and constraints weighing on the legislator. In particular, the federal origin of the Sherman Act 
set limits to its scope and potential reach. The very nature of American political institutions 
and the existence of two levels of jurisdiction, federal and state, constrained the legislative 
freedom of Congress. Congress could only work within the boundaries of its competencies – 
federal level legislation, interstate or foreign relationships. It could not deal with anti-
competitive behaviour taking place within the borders of a given state. One of the first 
antitrust cases, US vs E.C.Knight (1895), clearly illustrated and in fact institutionalised the 
impact of the ‘commerce clause’ on the American antitrust tradition.  
 
10.3.1.2 US vs E.C. Knight or the impact of the ‘commerce clause’  
In 1892, the Federal Government filed suit against the ‘sugar trust’, on grounds of monopoly 
and attempt to monopolise. Having merged five formerly independent companies, the ‘sugar 
trust’ controlled more than 90% of the sugar refining capacity of the United States. In January 
1895, the Supreme Court dismissed the case. Justices had made a distinction between 
manufacturing and production on the one hand, interstate and foreign commerce on the other. 
Since all production sites of the sugar trust were located within one state, the Sherman 
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Antitrust Act, the Supreme Court argued, could not apply. Competency lay with state 
judiciaries.  
 
US vs E.C.Knight became a building case for the American antitrust tradition and the 
particular reading of the Sherman Act then made by the Supreme Court was to be used in 
many cases to follow. With respect to cartels or loose agreements, which often crossed over 
state boundaries, the Sherman Act was read as a prohibition law. These forms of collusion 
became per se ‘unreasonable restraints of trade’. On the other hand, tight combinations and 
mergers that implied legal incorporation within one state could escape prosecution and were 
thus generally deemed ‘reasonable’. Only extreme forms of concentration that created 
outright monopolies with a clear impact on trade were to be prohibited (Taft 1911). Emerging 
from early Supreme Court readings, this interpretation was to have significant and 
unexpected consequences for the American economy.  
 
Following upon the decision in the E.C.Knight case, corporate lawyers were soon 
encouraging their clients to merge rather than cooperate informally, thus launching the first 
and most dramatic merger wave in American industrial history (Thorelli 1954, Sklar 1988, 
Fligstein 1990). The ensuing reconstruction of the American economic landscape along 
oligopolistic and corporate lines was thus, and ironically, the partially unintended and 
contingent consequence of a legislation that had originally been enacted under pressure from 
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advocates of small-scale, competitive capitalism (Thorelli 1954, Fligstein 1990, Roy 1997). 
The American antitrust tradition that was born through this process was quite unique, shaped 
as it was by peculiar historical legacies and institutional constraints. Somewhat later in the 
century, its impact would come to be felt in many other countries as well as in the space in 
between, where cross-national transactions were taking place.  
 
10.3.2 Transfer and the main actors 
The widespread impact of American antitrust principles was the consequence of a large-scale 
and cross-national process of transfer. The two main stages of this process had that in 
common that they corresponded in history to periods of American geopolitical strength. In 
1945, the USA had achieved unprecedented weight, both geopolitical and economic. In the 
years that followed, former allies and enemies alike, in the Western sphere, became 
dependent upon the superpower for survival and revival means. In 1989, communist promises 
were fully exposed as a sham. The American dream was left relatively uncontested and the 
USA remained as the only world superpower.  
  
In both periods, power on one side and dependence on the other led to the temptation of 
homogenisation. There was an attempt to lay the foundations of a new economic and political 
world order in 1945 and an attempt to expand them in 1989. The transformation of economic 
and social structures was seen as the surest way to anchor weak and dependent countries on 
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the side of ‘peace and democracy’ (Hoffman 1951, Hogan 1985). In both periods, American 
models and actors played a significant role. 
 
10.3.2.1 American missionaries 
In the post Second World War period, American public agencies in charge of foreign affairs 
set themselves an ambitious goal. The State Department in Washington, the American 
Military Government in Germany or the Economic Cooperation Administration, the agency 
running the Marshall Plan, saw it as their mission to fight in Europe the ‘communist party 
line’ thanks to the ‘American production line’ (Hoffman 1951). This meant a radical 
structural transformation of European economies and industries and the redefinition, in 
particular, of trade patterns on the old continent using the American economic space as the 
model of reference (Hoffman 1951, Van der Pijl 1984, Hogan 1985, Djelic 1998). A small 
group of progressive American businessmen, active in Washington since the New Deal, was 
particularly involved in this project. In their desire to give the rest of the free world ‘an 
opportunity to learn of the principles and advantages of free enterprise’, these American 
missionaries singled out as one of their core priorities the transfer to partner countries of 
American competition legislation (Hoffman 1951, Hogan 1985, Djelic 1998). They saw the 
American antitrust tradition as both a key element of the American model and as a potentially 
powerful tool of its transfer to other countries.  
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After 1989, American involvement in the transformation of Eastern European countries was 
less visible although quite real. Here again, the rationale was that economic prosperity and a 
democratisation of economic structures were the preconditions to political stability and peace. 
And a democratisation of economic structures seemed to imply the transfer of antitrust and 
anti-monopoly policy (Pittman 1996). This time, a key actor on the American side was the 
Antitrust Division in the US Department of Justice. Russell Pittman, then Chief of the 
Competition Policy Section of the Antitrust Division was, together with other American 
experts, closely involved in the drafting of Eastern European anti-monopoly acts (Joskow and 
Tsukanova 1995, Pittman 1996). 
 
10.3.2.2 European Modernisers 
The transfer had the support, at all stages, of small groups within national communities. 
American missionaries worked together with local actors to push along their ambitious 
objectives. In Germany, the main local counterpart was Ludwig Erhard, Minister of 
Economic Affairs and then Chancellor. In the context of European negotiations, the network 
around the Frenchman Jean Monnet turned out to be key. In Russia, Igor Gaidar was 
instrumental. Interestingly, these small groups were quite marginal in their own country. 
Their real influence depended upon the control they had on key positions of institutional 
power, on their ability to preserve this control over time and on the support granted to them 
by foreign and in particular American actors. 
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10.3.3 Stages of transfer and negotiations 
The first stage of the transfer process, after 1945, had two sides to it. On the one hand, 
American missionaries worked at the national level, imposing the American model of 
competition regulation or fostering its voluntary adoption in dependent countries. The case of 
Germany is presented below as an example of that strategy. On the other hand, Americans 
initiated or encouraged the setting up of cross-national institutions that would become 
powerful relays of the American tradition of competition regulation. The European Coal and 
Steel Community (ECSC) was negotiated in this context. The second stage of transfer 
followed the fall of the Berlin Wall and is illustrated below by the Russian case.  
 
10.3.3.1 The case of Germany – from coercion to imitation 
In 1945, Allied forces assimilated the horrors of the Nazi regime with the peculiar structure 
of German industry. Parallels were drawn, in particular, between political authoritarianism 
and state-coordinated cartelisation of the industry (Martin 1950). When West Germany 
became, in 1947, a key bulwark in the fight against communism, Western occupying powers 
thus defined it as their task to bring about not only a democratisation of the political regime 
but also a radical transformation of the German economic and industrial structure. The 
overwhelming power of the USA in the western alliance meant that the economic model 
would be American and an important feature of that model was the peculiar definition of 
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competition regulation embodied in the antitrust tradition (Berghahn 1986, Schwartz 1991, 
Djelic 1998).  
 
In 1947, the American Military Government imposed a decartelisation and deconcentration 
law with effect in what would become the Federal Republic of Germany. This law could 
easily be traced to the American antitrust tradition (Damm 1958, Taylor 1979, Djelic 1998). 
With respect to restrictive practices, cartels, combines or trusts, it was a prohibition law but it 
said little about size or concentration of production. While intent on transferring to Germany 
the characteristically American fight against cartels and restrictive practices, American 
occupation authorities also advocated in fact for the German industry an oligopolistic 
structure. The expectation was that American inspired competition regulation would lead in 
Germany – as it had done in the USA – to the emergence of oligopolies in most sectors, with 
firms large enough to allow economies of scale and scope. Americans were of the mind that 
‘oligopolies, when policed by the vigorous enforcement of antitrust and anticartel laws as in 
the United States, yield pretty good results’ (OMGUS, Bd18).   
 
At the same time, American missionaries were quite aware that radical transformations of 
that sort would only outlast the period of acute geopolitical dependence if Germans 
themselves actively appropriated them. In March 1948, American occupation authorities thus 
asked German agencies to prepare and submit a trade practice law dealing with the problem 
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of agreements and cartels. This law, it was agreed, once accepted by German and Allied 
authorities, would replace the 1947 legislation. It took ten years for the Germans to finally 
agree on a bill and the Federal Law against Restraints of Competition was only enacted in 
July 1957.   
 
The final version of the German law was on the whole quite congruent with American 
antitrust tradition. Cartels and loose agreements were identified as unreasonable 
combinations in restraint of trade and outlawed per se. However, the German legislator 
provided for a number of exceptions. The Cartel Office (Bundeskartelamt) created in 1958 
and modelled on the American Federal Trade Commission was granted and would come to 
exert a certain amount of leeway through enforcement of the law and monitoring of the 
exceptions (Damm 1958).  
 
10.3.3.2 Towards the definition of cross-national standards: European competition 
regulation 
While the United States were encouraging or imposing the adoption by individual nations of 
their antitrust tradition, they were also pressing for initiatives with a cross-national 
dimension. In Western Europe, the French led the way by proposing in May 1950 a plan for 
pooling European coal and steel industries. Jean Monnet and the French Planning Council 
were behind the proposal. To alleviate American fears that this project might lead to the 
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emergence of a European wide cartel, Monnet insisted that the goal was to create a 
competitive space to stimulate an increase in production and productivity (Monnet 1976, 
Djelic 1998). And in fact, a small group of American experts were hard at work in the 
background, preparing antitrust provisions for the future coal and steel community. Robert 
Ball, a long-term friend of Jean Monnet was one of them. But the key figure was Robert 
Bowie, legal counsel to the High Commission in Germany, who was also closely involved in 
the drafting of the German anticartel act. A former Harvard Law School professor, Robert 
Bowie was an antitrust specialist. He came down to Paris in June 1950 and wrote the 
provisions that would become articles 60 and 61 of the ECSC treaty (Monnet 1976).  
  
Article 60 dealt with cartels and loose agreements, prohibiting them in principle. However, 
the European enforcement agency, the High Authority, was granted a certain amount of 
leeway to authorise, in times of crisis, a number of exceptions. Article 61 of the ECSC treaty 
dealt with abuses of market power due to concentration. In line with American antitrust 
tradition, only ‘unreasonable’ concentrations were prohibited. Concentrations and mergers 
that could be shown to lead to increased efficiency and productivity without representing a 
threat to competition could be authorised. Articles 60 and 61 of the ECSC treaty have a 
particular historical significance because they were transferred to the 1957 Rome treaty. As 
articles 85 and 86, they thus have become the foundation of competition regulation on the 
Western European market and in today’s European Union (Monnet 1976).  
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10.3.3.3 Multisided negotiations: the case of Russia 
On March 22, 1991, an antimonopoly law was adopted by the Russian parliament. The ‘Law 
on Competition and Limitation of Monopoly Activities in Goods Markets’ had been in the 
making for a little less than a year. A Federal ‘Committee on Antimonopoly Policy and 
Support of New Economic Structures’ (GKAP) and 80 local antimonopoly committees 
(AMCs) were created on the model of American and European regulatory agencies and put in 
charge of enforcement. American but also OECD and European experts had been involved in 
the process. Quite early on in fact, a debate had emerged as to whether Russia should model 
its anti-monopoly act on the American original or on the European version. In the end, the 
latter strategy prevailed and a close look at the Russian law shows that it takes after the 
European Economic Community version of competition legislation rather than directly after 
the American original (Pittman 1995). Allowing for exceptions, the European version of 
antitrust seemed less stringent and extreme than the American original. The very idea of 
competition and competition regulation being so radically foreign, in the early 1990s, to 
Russian economic traditions, the preference for a less extreme version made sense. To both 
foreign advisors and the Russian legislator, it increased the chances that such legislation 
would be accepted and implemented (Joskow and Tsukanova 1995, Pittman 1996). 
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In line with both American and European versions of antitrust, the Russian antimonopoly law 
did not identify market dominance or firm size per se as a problem. Only an abuse of 
dominant position could be prosecuted. With respect to cartels and loose agreements, on the 
other hand, the Russian law differed from both American and European acts. Cartels and 
loose agreements were not forbidden per se and the Russian law was not a prohibition act. 
The Russian legislator built upon the European version of antitrust, integrating into the text of 
the law the possibility for exceptions. Only abusive agreements and cartels were as a 
consequence deemed illegal and those were defined as cartels and agreements that ‘have or 
might have as their result a material limitation of competition’. The Russian law, furthermore, 
allows that ‘in exceptional instances’, even those abusive agreements or cartels might be 
deemed ‘lawful, if the economic subject proves that his actions facilitated or will facilitate the 
satiation of goods markets, the improvement of consumer properties of goods, and an 
increase in their competitiveness, particularly on the foreign market’ (GKAP 1991). 
 
10.3.4 Constraints and limits 
An historical perspective thus points to a common thread – a common ‘genetic code’ – 
linking different versions of competition regulation. These different versions can be traced to 
an American antitrust tradition, which was transferred to other parts of the world during the 
twentieth century. Beyond common origins, though, local versions of antitrust exhibit a 
number of important differences. These differences can be explained by the fact that the 
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transfer has been a contested process. They also reflect local institutional constraints that 
have had an impact, in particular, on implementation. 
 
10.3.4.1 Legacies, obstacles and resistance 
The project of transferring on a large-scale the peculiar American understanding of 
competition regulation was not, historically, an easy process. It had to face, at each stage, pre-
existing legacies, obstacles and resistance. Whether in Germany, Europe or Russia, the most 
violent reactions initially came from local business communities. In Germany, a powerful and 
organised opposition slowed down considerably negotiations around a German anticartel act. 
In fact, to prevent these negotiations from failing altogether, Americans had to keep up 
pressure for nearly ten years and to provide significant resources, in particular legal counsel. 
The resistance of business communities to a foreign understanding of competition also 
created difficulties for ECSC negotiations. This time again American pressure proved 
instrumental in preventing the negotiations from falling apart (Damm 1958, Djelic 1998). In 
the early 1990s, the emergent Russian business community was also the main obstacle to the 
adoption of American-inspired competition regulation principles.  
 
The consequence of resistance and obstacles was that the transfer has implied partial 
reinterpretation and local translation. At each stage of the transfer, foreign advisors and local 
legislators have had to adapt the original tradition to local conditions and constraints. The 
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American Sherman Act was a prohibition law when it came to cartels and loose agreements, 
outlawing all of them. In its dealings with mergers and tight combinations, it was an abuse 
law allowing most of them except in cases of abusive or monopolistic market power. The 
German anti-cartel law was in principle still a prohibition law but it reflected a difficult 
drafting process and in the end it was a compromise. Under pressure from the German 
business community, the legislator had allowed a number of exceptions. Under certain 
conditions, some cartels were treated as ‘reasonable restraints of trade’ that could be tolerated 
and even fostered. Both the European and Russian versions of antitrust have retained the 
principle of allowing for exceptions and, as a consequence, they have become in practice 
abuse laws not only in their dealings with mergers or tight combinations but also in their 
dealings with cartels or loose agreements.  
 
10.3.4.2 The problem of implementation  
Beyond the text of the law and its evolution at each stage of the transfer, it is also important 
to consider the problem of implementation. The Sherman Antitrust Act already left a lot of 
space for interpretation. The role of the Supreme Court and enforcement agencies in shaping 
the act through its implementation have been quite significant. This space for interpretation 
through implementation remained at all stages of the transfer process, which turned an 
American tradition into a ‘universal’ regulation. The German Cartel Office or the European 
High Authority had a certain discretion in their interpretation and use of the various clauses 
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of exceptions allowing the constitution of cartels in times of crisis or in certain core industries 
(Berghahn 1986, Maxeiner 1986). In the Russian case, definitions and concepts were 
sufficiently vague that regulatory agencies and judicial courts were bound to have a 
significant influence with respect to implementation. Circumstances for exemption were in 
particular so broadly defined that implementation became key. 
  
Similarities in the text and in the contents of the law are therefore not enough to point to a 
universal antimonopoly legislation. Important questions are those of implementation and 
enforcement. The nature and characteristics of the institutions in charge of interpreting the act 
and of enforcing it are important variables. The agenda, value structure and set of resources 
of the groups managing to gain control over these institutions are also naturally important. In 
the case of Western Europe, the transfer of the American antitrust tradition after the end of 
the Second World War had come together with a large scale and institutionalised training and 
technical assistance program. The objective had been to familiarise with or even socialise into 
the antitrust tradition those Europeans who would be in charge of interpreting, implementing 
and enforcing the antitrust acts. This particular dimension of the transfer process has not 
taken place so far, at least to the same extent, in Russia. The lack of a systematic and large 
scale technical assistance program and the absence of long term and institutionalised links 
between Western and Russian regulatory agencies are clearly decreasing further the 
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likelihood that the Russian law will be implemented and enforced in the tradition originally 
defined in the United States.  
 
10.4. CFC REGULATION: NEGOTIATING A GLOBAL FRAMEWORK 
We now turn to our second case of international regulation, which exemplifies quite a 
different pattern of emergence and diffusion. In contrast to competition regulation, the 
regulatory framework for ozone layer protection is not easily traceable to a purely national 
tradition. Rather, common standards emerged in this case from a process of cross-national 
negotiation and in response to a global issue. 
 
In 1974, two scientists from the University of California accused chlorofluorocarbons 
(CFCs), a set of chemical compounds, of dangerously depleting the stratospheric ozone layer. 
The ozone layer protects the earth against UV rays and its depletion could present important 
dangers for humans, including greater risks of cancer. Increasing evidence supporting the 
hypothesis ultimately led to the Montreal international protocol, in 1987. The protocol set up 
an almost global prohibition of CFCs with a dramatic impact for the CFC industry. In this 
section, we describe and deconstruct the process that has led to such a broad regulation. We 
ask about key actors and conditions pushing it along. We also look into constraints, in 
particular at the national level, that set clear limits to a global homogenisation of CFC 
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regulation (for an extensive analysis and for methodological information, see Bensedrine 
1997).  
 
10.4.1 The negotiation process and its main stages 
In an immediate response to the 1974 accusations, the USA, Canada, Germany, and Sweden 
started regulating CFCs, limiting in particular their use in aerosols. Then, in April 1977, the 
American administration organised a conference with the aim of encouraging all CFC 
producing countries to prohibit CFCs in aerosols. At this stage, the American administration 
seemed to favour national regulations in order to avoid a lengthy and difficult process of 
international negotiation. In December 1978, representatives from 14 countries met again, 
this time in Munich. Americans gave an overview of their recently enacted national 
legislation prohibiting CFCs in aerosols. By this meeting, the official American position had 
evolved significantly and American representatives in fact appeared to encourage a ‘unified 
global approach’. Only a small group of countries aligned themselves on this position. 
Together with the United States, Canada, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Holland, and West 
Germany came to constitute the core of what would later be called ‘the Toronto group’. In a 
1980 conference hosted by Norway, representatives from these countries called for an 
immediate reduction in the use of CFCs. In contrast, the European Community remained, as 
an entity, quite opposed to the elaboration of an international framework, although it decided 
at the time on partial CFC prohibition in aerosols.   
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The first half of the 1980s was less busy. The de-regulatory program of the Reagan 
administration combined with the persisting lack of strong evidence regarding ozone layer 
depletion to slow things down. There was a widespread perception, furthermore, that 
prohibiting CFCs in aerosols was enough. However, the discovery in 1985 of the ozone hole 
sparked renewed activity with respect to CFC regulation. Officials from the American 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) again took steps to bring about an international 
agreement. The American ozone diplomacy became in fact, at that time, more active than 
ever (Benedick 1991). EPA officials and American diplomats worked together with the 
United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) and American agencies such as the NASA 
or the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Agency (NOAA) to organise a series of national 
and international workshops and scientific meetings on the ozone layer issue. Intensifying 
their relationships with countries from the Toronto group, American officials and embassies 
put pressure on those countries such as France or Great Britain that did not push for 
regulation. Using the US Information Agency network, Americans also launched an 
extensive media campaign to alert public opinions in Europe and Japan. American officials 
and scientists were sent all over the world to give speeches, press conferences, radio and 
television interviews. Coverage of the issue by national media was thus quite significant. 
Highest-level officials such as EPA Administrator Lee Thomas, Secretary of State Shultz or 
President Reagan himself relayed this campaign through their personal contacts with key 
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foreign decision-makers. At the 1987 Summit of the seven major industrial democracies, 
President Reagan succeeded in making ‘protection of the ozone layer the first priority among 
environmental issues requiring common action’ (Benedick 1991). 
 
The direct consequence of these efforts was the Montreal Protocol. Signed in 1987, the 
protocol set a 1999 target for partial CFC prohibition on a global scale. Soon, though, the 
anticipated reduction in CFC production appeared insufficient, particularly in light of new 
scientific knowledge. Green pressure groups together with official representatives of 
countries from the ‘Toronto Group’ stepped up pressure by calling for stricter regulation. The 
result was a revision of the Montreal Protocol in 1990, which now requested total CFC 
prohibition on a global scale. Another revision in 1992 not only called for an acceleration of 
the process but also announced a plan to prohibit HCFCs, the first generation of CFC 
substitutes.  
 
At first sight, such an acceleration and extension of CFC regulation made perfect sense. The 
nature of the problem – ozone layer depletion – was global and the environmental and human 
risks associated with it were of great consequences. In reality, though, this evolution was 
neither easy nor smooth. It took a lot of energy on the part of a rather small group of actors to 
push along and finally bring about an international prohibition of CFCs.  
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10.4.2 Main actors and conditions 
While identification of the main actors is relatively easy, weighing their respective influence 
seems much more difficult. A few proactive countries, the ‘Toronto Group’, and their 
administrations were instrumental in steering the process along. Amongst these countries, the 
role of the United States was particularly significant. A more detailed analysis reveals, 
though, that the process was not negotiated only at the level of governmental agencies. The 
importance of scientists, media, NGOs and International Institutions in pushing the issue 
through debate as well as direct and indirect political pressure should not be underestimated. 
Interestingly, key manufacturers also turned out, at certain points in time, to play an active 
role.  
 
Scientists provided governments, NGOs and international institutions with information and 
evidence on ozone layer depletion. Their research results, though, would not have been so 
compelling without the large budgets granted by national and international institutions but 
also by industry trade associations. International institutions also played an important role by 
providing a forum where governments could negotiate on a transnational level. National 
environmental administrations and scientific organisations put significant pressure on 
governments to take the issue seriously. Their action was strongly reinforced and 
supplemented by that of environmental NGOs and media supports. In the background, 
multiple interactions led to the creation of a dense network of individual actors holding key 
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positions of power. This network of actors and institutions triggered, upheld and accelerated 
the momentum towards the making of a global regulation. There were multiple motives at 
play, though, ranging from environmental protection to the preservation of economic interests 
or the political will to take the lead on an international issue. 
 
10.4.2.1 The American lead 
While we have underscored the multiplicity of actors involved, it is also clear that at different 
key moments the United States exercised leadership with important consequences. American 
scientists were the first to propose, in 1974, the ozone layer depletion hypothesis. 
Immediately, American media seized upon it, playing a significant part in its early diffusion.  
As soon as November 1974, the powerful American-based green pressure group, Natural 
Resources Defence Council (NRDC), reacted by filing petitions with three American 
government agencies – the Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC), the Food and 
Drug Administration (FDA) and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). The aim, 
already, was a prohibition of CFCs. In May 1975, it started suing the CPSC because it had 
not moved on the issue.  
 
American public authorities and governmental agencies were thus the first to experience 
strong pressure from NGOs and the media. As a consequence, American authorities could not 
ignore the issue and congressional hearings were repeatedly held on the matter. At the same 
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time, media supports and pressure groups had alerted directly American consumers. As a 
result, products containing CFCs tended to remain unsold on store shelves. Quite early on, 
leading American aerosol manufacturers thus started considering converting their American 
factories to CFC substitutes. This situation led the US to enact a national legislation 
prohibiting CFCs in aerosols as early as 1978. Then, in 1980, the Environmental Protection 
Agency administrator announced her intent to extend CFC regulation to all uses when the 
Europeans were still discussing about a possible recommendation and the Japanese had only 
just set up a commission to review the situation. 
 
While on the surface things calmed down somewhat during the early 1980s, the issue was in 
fact still bubbling. The NRDC launched a new judiciary action against the EPA in November 
1984. A potential outcome of the litigation was for the EPA to be obliged by the courts to 
regulate CFCs, no matter what foreign countries were doing. During the proceedings, a new 
EPA Administrator was appointed in January 1985. The new Administrator, Lee Thomas, 
immediately announced that ozone depletion was ‘a big issue’ and he defined a ‘timetable to 
move forward’. The discovery, this same year, of the ozone hole made the issue even ‘bigger’ 
and started off another chain reaction, Americans taking the lead once again. The EPA 
pushed the NRDC and the Alliance for Responsible CFC policy – an ad hoc American trade 
association – to enter negotiations. Discussions led in January 1986 to an agreement on a 
‘Stratospheric Ozone Protection Plan’.  
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Another important step was made soon after that, when the American firm DuPont, a major 
producer of CFCs, declared that it would give its support to the prohibition of CFCs if the 
American government vowed to work towards a global market for substitutes. As soon as 
enough assurance had been given, DuPont started to encourage other firms to support the 
process, acting through the seat it held at the board of the Alliance for Responsible CFC 
Policy. Soon enough, members of the Alliance were converted and the latter came to claim its 
support for an international regulation. Hence, the American lead in the process of 
negotiating an international regulation of CFCs can largely be explained by the peculiar 
nature of American political and legal institutions. Although economic interests and industry 
support proved important in the end, they were themselves very much the consequence of the 
institutional context. This context created favourable conditions for NGOs, individuals or 
civil society groups to take action against or sue Agencies or private companies when they 
suspected them of not implementing policies that were in their interests. 
  
10.4.2.2 The European adhesion 
Only by the mid-1980s was Europe as an entity ready to accept the idea of an international 
regulation of CFCs. Conditions had changed dramatically as a consequence of the discovery 
of the ozone hole but also under the pressure of NGOs, international institutions, foreign 
governments and American agencies. Moreover, an international scientific and ‘epistemic 
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community’ (Haas, 1991) had formed in the early 1980s, gaining strong influence on key 
decision-makers in a number of countries. This change in conditions had first an impact in 
Belgium, leading that country to rally the pro-regulatory camp. This had a particularly 
significant impact because Belgium would assume the presidency of the European 
Community during the first half of 1987, which proved to be a key period in the negotiation 
process. Then came the change of heart of Great Britain. In this case, economic motives 
played an important part. The official support of the British government for an international 
regulation of CFCs was only declared after ICI, the national biggest CFC producer, had lifted 
its opposition. France then remained in an uncomfortable diplomatic position that soon 
proved to be unsustainable. The French adhesion finally opened the way, in 1987, to an 
international binding agreement.  
 
10.4.3 Constraints and limits 
In spite of strong American involvement and, in time, European support, regulating CFCs 
was far from an easy task. Protecting the ozone layer would have significant consequences in 
many industries in all parts of the world. CFCs were used in hundreds of different products 
(refrigerators, air conditioners, aerosols, fire extinguishers, plastic foams for example) that 
were manufactured by dozens of thousands of firms all over the world. Furthermore, market 
prospects for CFCs were still quite significant since it appeared that they could be used to 
produce a solvent for the booming electronics and precision mechanics industries. 
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10.4.3.1 Obstacles and resistance 
While CFCs had multiple applications, CFC production was concentrated among a small 
number of economically and politically powerful manufacturers such as the American 
DuPont and Allied-Signal, the French Elf-Atochem, the British ICI or the German Hoechst. 
Those firms provided altogether 75 % of the world production, leaving the rest of the market 
to twenty-two smaller producers operating mainly from the other side of the Iron Curtain, as 
well as in China and India. The agreement reached in 1987 implied that all producers, on a 
world-wide level, had to be brought to comply with a set of common norms. This would 
require transatlantic, East-West and South-North cooperation and means to monitor or even 
impose compliance. 
 
On top of these difficulties, or because of these difficulties, various countries or groups of 
countries had in turn coalesced during the negotiation process to slow it down or turn it to 
their advantage. The two most striking episodes of that sort were the strong initial European 
opposition and the relative American disengagement during the Reagan administration. 
Although the European Community had decided from the early 1980s on a partial CFC 
prohibition in aerosols, it remained still for another few years quite opposed to the idea of an 
international regulation. France, Great Britain and Italy were intent on protecting their 
national producers and thus rejected the propositions coming from West Germany for a 
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stricter European regulation of CFCs. As late as September 1986, France and Great Britain 
persisted in opposing the American regulatory project. These countries were able to block the 
European decision process because, at that time, decisions within the community required 
unanimity.  
 
Their opposition could not entirely be explained, though, by the existence of domestic 
producers. After all, Germany and the US also had many CFC related activities and they 
nevertheless were much stricter with respect to CFC regulation. Hence a particular country’s 
willingness to join or even to lead the international momentum also depended, as it turned 
out, on the particular political context at any given time. This is clearly illustrated by the case 
of the US that radically changed their position in 1981. When President Reagan took office in 
1981, the regulatory project of the previous administration was significantly slowed down if 
not brought to a halt. The newly appointed head of the EPA immediately asserted that the 
ozone-depletion theory was ‘highly controversial’ and could not be accepted as a basis for 
more governmental action. This viewpoint was echoed in Congress and was strongly 
supported by the industrial lobby that was then created under the label ‘Alliance for 
Responsible CFC Policy’. At the same time, American public opinion was being convinced 
that the ozone problem had more or less been solved thanks to the aerosol ban. The 
international process for ozone layer protection had temporarily lost, in that period, its 
strongest supporter.  
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It would take new scientific evidence in 1985, pointing to a threat much more serious than 
anybody had envisioned for attitudes to change. The pressure stemming from the scientific 
community, public opinion and NGOs as well as a new series of judicial actions against 
governmental agencies were instrumental in pushing the Americans back into the driving 
seat.  
 
10.4.3.2 The problem of implementation  
The Montreal Protocol in 1987 and its amended versions defined global standards for the 
regulation of CFCs. However, in spite of the global nature and reach of this Protocol, 
significant national and regional differences have remained to this day. These differences 
have been due to divergent interpretations of an initially loosely defined regulation, to the 
existence of various statutes under the same regulation for different types of countries, to 
differences between national policy styles, to technological choices, as well as to mere non-
compliance problems.  
 
10.4.3.2.1 An initially loosely defined international regulation 
While its general direction and objectives were clear, the regulation that emerged from the 
Montreal Protocol remained rather loose for several years. A number of ‘loopholes’ were 
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allowed to persist making divergent interpretations possible and quite likely in fact. A key 
source of ambiguity was the authorization given to low consuming countries from the 
developing world to increase their per capita annual CFC use ‘in order to meet their basic 
domestic needs’ during a 10-year period. But the concept of ‘basic domestic needs’ was not 
precisely defined in the protocol and was therefore open to interpretation. According to some 
developing-country governments, trade barriers should not affect their exports of products 
containing CFAs since export revenues could be considered as means to satisfy ‘basic 
domestic needs’. According to the US special Ambassador, Benedick (1991), negotiators 
were well aware that these and other issues remained to be solved. However they had ‘made 
their top priority the setting into motion of an international process’. 
 
10.4.3.2.2 Various statutes under the same regulation 
The 1990 London amendments to the Montreal protocol significantly reduced the number of 
loopholes and the space for interpretation. In particular, parties to the protocol decided that 
the export of products containing CFCs was inconsistent with the intent of the protocol. 
Interestingly though, the discussions that took place in London with an aim to tightening the 
regulation were not always successful in that respect. A clarification of the Montreal protocol 
sometimes led to a differentiation between categories of countries to which different 
provisions applied. In particular, both Russia and the developing countries remained under a 
special regime allowing them to increase their CFC production during respectively 5 and 10 
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years after these chemicals were prohibited everywhere else. Russia had argued that its 5 
years-plan system imposed an equivalent delay in compliance to the protocol. Developing 
countries had underlined, among others, their marginal part in global CFC consumption, as 
well as their user industries' inability to afford substitutes. Developing countries also obtained 
the creation of a Multilateral Fund that would provide them with financial and technical 
assistance to switch to substitutes. On the one hand, the fund was an instrument of 
homogenisation and it favoured the global extension of the protocol. On the other, it created a 
disparity among countries since it increased the cost of the protocol for industrialised 
countries, while enabling developing countries to join the protocol at a much lower cost than 
would have been otherwise possible. 
 
Another case of differential treatment under the protocol was illustrated by the special status 
of the European Economic Community. Originally, the idea was that every member country 
had to reduce its production and use of CFC. After harsh negotiations with the United States, 
the European Community finally obtained agreement to be treated as a single consumption 
unit. Although CFC producers were still constrained by the regulation, this provided 
European user industries with more operational flexibility. During the Montreal meeting, the 
Canadian delegation had introduced an ‘industrial rationalisation’ clause that allowed 
rationalisation only between CFC plants of less than 25,000 tons capacity each. As it turned 
out, European producers could not take advantage of that clause because the capacity of their 
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plants was above that threshold. In the following years, European negotiators were thus busy 
lobbying for a change in the rationalisation clause. The protocol was finally amended in that 
direction in 1990 and Europe had from that point on the possibility to increase CFC 
production in some member countries in counterpart to plant shutdowns in other countries. 
This way, the European Community obtained agreement to be treated as a single production 
unit while retaining its full voting power – 12 votes at the time. 
 
Hence international heterogeneity did not totally disappear with time. Part of the change was 
that the source of such heterogeneity switched from divergent interpretations of the protocol 
or deficiencies in the protocol, to a relatively increased heterogeneity in the protocol itself. 
This evolution of the international framework seemed mainly due to the need for gathering as 
much support as possible from countries that were hitherto unhappy with the terms of the 
protocol.  
 
10.4.3.2.3 Differences in national policy styles 
Another source of divergence came from the interplay between the protocol and the national 
institutions and policy styles through which it was implemented on the ground. The protocol 
in fact only imposed a series of deadlines for the phasing-out of CFC production and 
consumption. Each country was left totally free to develop its own policy to reach the targets 
set by the protocol. At one extreme, Europe mainly relied on what was called a conventional 
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approach, which consisted in voluntary agreements between trade associations and 
governments. At the other extreme, the United States relied on tax policy and legal penalties 
for non-compliance. 
 
10.4.3.2.4 Technological choices 
The concrete implementation of the Montreal Protocol also differed among countries because 
of different technological choices for the substitution of CFCs. An important difference was 
related to the focus of some countries on HCFC or HFC substitute technologies, because only 
the latter was totally ozone friendly (but both had greenhouse effects). Another interesting 
example was related to the global cosmetic industry. Actually, some national industries have 
replaced CFCs in deodorant aerosols by other types of propellants that might present safety 
hazards whereas, partly because of these concerns, other national industries have completely 
abandoned the aerosol technology in deodorants.  
 
10.4.3.2.5 Non compliance  
Another limit to the institutionalisation of an international CFC regulation has come, 
naturally, from problems of non-compliance. Some countries do not fully comply with the 
Protocol, while even those that try to comply have to struggle with a large black market. In 
the mid-1990s both environmentalists and company managers strongly denounced CFC 
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smuggling and illegal traffic as a key issue that should be dealt with. According to one 
company official, CFC smuggling was in 1995 the main black market in Florida, after drug 
dealing. This seemed mainly due to the lack of enforcement of the protocol in some countries 
such as Russia, enabling the illegal production of CFCs in those countries and their export to 
Eastern and Western Europe, to the United States and elsewhere. So both companies 
producing substitutes and environmental organisations have pressured governments to step up 
their enforcement and litigation activities. 
 
10.5 DISCUSSION 
We have focused, in this paper, on transnational regulation as one powerful type of global 
pressure. Looking in turn at competition regulation and at the regulation of CFCs, we have 
compared the patterns of emergence, diffusion and institutionalisation of these two sets of 
norms. Beyond apparently global and universal norms contributing to the world-wide 
homogenisation of economic conditions, we found processes that were both historically 
contingent and embedded in peculiar sets of institutional constraints. Probing into the origins 
of both sets of regulations, asking about the actors and mechanisms of their diffusion or 
implementation and searching for possible obstacles and resistance, we identified significant 
differences between our two case studies.  
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In the case of competition regulation, the beginnings were local. Antitrust emerged in post 
Civil War United States, in response to a dramatic increase in the power of business cartels 
and aggregates. The enactment of the Sherman Act and its early interpretation reflected in 
part an economic logic. They also revealed, though, a multiplicity of political and social 
interests and their confrontation within the young federation. After 1945, the American 
antitrust tradition acquired another dimension. The rules of exchange and competition that 
regulated trade between American states were turned into universal standards, at least within 
the Western sphere. This process reflected American geopolitical dominance. It was part of 
the construction, under American leadership, of an institutional framework for transnational 
trade. With the fall of the Berlin Wall in the late 1980s, the process of diffusion of an 
American antitrust tradition entered its second stage. By the mid-1990s, around fifty 
countries in the world had an antitrust or competition legislation that prohibited cartels and 
set limits to anti-competitive practices.  
  
In the case of CFC regulation, the pattern of emergence and institutionalisation of a world-
wide standard was quite different. The process started later, in the early 1970s, and the 
triggering issue – a large-scale environmental threat – had, by nature, global implications. 
Regulation in this case was thus from the start negotiated at a cross-national level. The result 
was a compromise regulation that was then adopted and in the process also partially adapted 
in the countries that signed the protocol. The process and the emerging common standard 
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reflected the multiplicity of actors, the diversity of their interests and the balance of their 
resources. As such, it was far from being driven only by an economic logic. It was also an 
eminently political debate that was constrained by the institutional framework in which it 
took place.  
  
Our case studies thus illustrate two quite different patterns with respect to the emergence of 
cross-national regulation. On the one hand, a national model was diffused, at some point in 
time, to other countries and to supra-national communities, becoming in the process a global 
standard. On the other hand, a set of norms negotiated at a multinational level was then 
locally adopted – and partially adapted – by individual nations, which signed a common 
protocol. In the case of antitrust, the emergence, early definition and interpretation and the 
diffusion of the regulation owed a lot to the intervention and initiative of public actors, state 
agencies and politicians. In the case of CFC regulation, there was a greater diversity of actors 
and negotiators. The role, in particular, of business groups or representatives and even more 
of civil society through the organised scientific community, environmental NGOs and the 
media cannot be underestimated. 
 
While both regulatory frameworks contribute to a partial world-wide homogenisation of 
economic conditions, our double exercise in deconstruction has shown the process of the 
emergence, diffusion or interpretation of these international regulations to have been 
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historically contingent and highly constrained by unique institutional conditions. 
Contextualisation has made it possible, furthermore, to point to important differences 
between our two cases of transnational regulation. Beyond those differences, though, we 
would like to end with what emerged as two important common features. In both stories, we 
found that the United States played a key role. In the case of competition regulation, they 
provided the model and fostered its transfer. In the case of CFC regulation, the impact was 
less direct. Still, the United States led the early process of discussions and negotiations and 
their varying degree of involvement, throughout the period, drove the ups and downs of 
international negotiations with a significant impact, ultimately, on the negotiated outcome.  
Another important conclusion emerging from our two cases is that the making of cross-
national regulation says little about its interpretation and implementation on the ground. We 
show a fair amount of decoupling between global standards and their local implementation. 
Key filters, in both cases, have been national institutions but also those national communities 
that opposed and resisted the standards. We found the result to be, with respect to 
implementation, a hybridisation or local translation of global standards. This, naturally, 
points to the limits of what is called the process of globalisation. By the mid-1990s, around 
fifty countries on six continents had an antitrust or competition legislation that regulated 
cartels and set limits to anticompetitive practices. By May 1999, 168 countries had ratified 
the initial agreement of the Montreal protocol and a little less subsequent amendments. In 
spite of this apparent widespread diffusion of common regulatory standards, our results lead 
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us to question the ultimate likelihood of a full convergence, on a transnational scale, of 
institutions, structures and organisational behaviours.  
 
REFERENCES 
Alvarez, J. L. ed. (1998). The Diffusion and Consumption of Business Knowledge. New York: 
Saint Martin’s Press.  
Arias, M. E. and M. Guillén (1998). ‘The Transfer of Organizational Techniques across 
Borders’, in Alvarez (ed.), The Diffusion and Consumption of Business Knowledge. New 
York: Saint Martin’s Press.  
Benedick, R. (1991). Ozone Diplomacy. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
Bensedrine, J. (1997). Les Stratégies des Entreprises dans les Processus Institutionnels : Le 
Cas des Producteurs de CFC et la Protection de la Couche d’Ozone. Doctoral Dissertation, 
ESSEC Graduate School of Business and University of Aix-en-Provence.  
Berghahn, V. (1986). The Americanization of West German Industry. New York: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Cagin, S. and P. Dray (1993). Between Earth and Sky.  New York: Pantheon Books. 
Campbell, J., R. Hollingsworth and L. Lindberg eds. (1991). Governance of the American 
Economy. New York: Cambridge University Press.  
Chandler, A. (1990). Scale and Scope. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.  
  
469 
469 
Clemens, L. and J. Cook (1999). ‘Politics and Institutionalism: Explaining Durability and 
Change’. Annual Review of Sociology, 25. 
Damm, W. (1958). National and International Factors Influencing Cartel Legislation in 
Germany. PhD dissertation, University of Chicago. 
DiMaggio, P. and W. Powell (1983). ‘The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism 
and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields’. American Sociological Review, 48. 
Djelic, M. L. (1998). Exporting the American Model. Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
Djelic, M. L. (1999). ‘From a Typology of Neo-institutional Arguments to their Cross-
fertilisation’. Unpublished paper. 
Dobbin, F. (1994). Forging Industrial Policy. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Erhard, L. (1958). Prosperity through Competition. New York: Frederick Praeger. 
Fligstein, N. (1990). The Transformation of Corporate Control. Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press.  
GKAP (1991). ‘Law on Competition and Limitation of Monopolistic Activity in Goods 
Markets’. Adopted by the RSFSR Supreme Soviet, March 22.  
Guillén, M. (1994). Models of Management. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.  
Haas, P. (1991), ‘Policy Responses to Stratospheric Ozone Depletion’. Global Environmental 
Change, June. 
Hawkins, M. (1997). Social Darwinism in European and American Thought, 1860-1945. 
New York: Cambridge University Press.   
  
470 
470 
Hoffman, P. (1951). Peace can be Won. New York: Doubleday. 
Hogan, M. (1985). ‘American Marshall Planners and the Search for a European Neo-
Capitalism’. American Historical Review, 90/1.  
Hollingsworth, R. and R. Boyer eds. (1997). Comparing Capitalisms: The Embeddedness of 
Institutions. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Joskow, P and N. Tsukanova (1995). Discussions and interviews with Paul Joskow, MIT 
Professor and Natasha Tsukanova, Russian Committee on Antimonopoly Policy (GKAP). 
Liftin, K. (1994). Ozone Discourse : Science and Politics in Global Environmental 
Cooperation. New York: Columbia University Press. 
Martin, J. (1950). All Honorable Men. Boston, MA: Little Brown.  
Maxeiner, J. (1986). Policy and Methods in German and American Antitrust Law. New York: 
Praeger. 
McCraw, T. (1984). Prophets of Regulation. Cambridge, MA: Belknap of HUP.  
Monnet, J. (1976). Mémoires. Paris, France: Fayard.   
Morrisette, P. (1989). ‘The Evolution of Policy Responses to Stratospheric Ozone Depletion’. 
Natural Resources Journal, 29. 
Ohmae, K. (1995). The End of the Nation State. Cambridge, MA: Free Press. 
OMGUS Records, Bd18 – Bipartite Control Office, Economics Division and Decartelization 
Branch. Bundesarchiv, Koblenz, Germany.  
  
471 
471 
Pittman, R. (1995). ‘Competition Policy in Russia and the United States : The Russian Law 
and the American Experience’, unpublished paper.  
Pittman, R. (1996). Discussions with Russell Pittman, Chief of the Competition Policy 
Section of the Antitrust Division, US Department of Justice. 
Rowlands, I. (1995). The Politics of Global Atmospheric Change. Manchester, UK: 
Manchester University Press.  
Schwartz, T. (1991). America’s Germany. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
Scott, R., J. Meyer et al. (1994). Institutional Environments and Organizations. Newbury 
Park, CA: Sage.   
Sklar, M. (1988). Corporate Reconstruction of American Capitalism, 1890-1916. New York: 
Cambridge University Press.  
Thorelli, H. (1954). The Federal Antitrust Policy : Origination of an American Tradition. 
Baltimore, MA: John Hopkins University Press.  
Weiss, L. (1988). Creating Capitalism. New York: Basil Blackwell. 
Whitley, R. ed. (1992). European Business Systems. London: Sage. 
Whitley (1999). Divergent Capitalisms. Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
Whitley, R. and P. H. Kristensen eds. (1996). The Changing European Firm. London: 
Routledge.  
  
 
